We ought to so some things, and we ought not do others. Of those things that we ought to do, we sometime can give a correct account of why we ought to do them. Othertimes, when we do what we ought to do, we give an incorrect account. Frequently, the following account is given; it is called the ‘Utilitarian’ account:
For some individual S and action A, S ought to A if and only if A maximizes intrinsic value.
The only bearer of intrinsic value is pleasure.
Therefore, for some individual S and action A, S ought to A if and only if A maximizes pleasure.
The preceding argument is called ‘Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism.’ It is a conjunction of two theses: consequentialism, a claim about what is right-namely to maximize value-and hedonism, a claim about what is good-namely, pleasure.
Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism was expounded in Britain in the 19th century by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, and is a very popular position. However, it has since been thought that the doctrine of the good should be revised so as to define the good more generally, as social utility (whilst leaving it open whether social utility is reducible to pleasure).
Utilitarian reasoning, when cited as a defence for a particular action, appears quite intuitive in a wide range of cases. Suppose, for example, you let a chicken live, rather than to kill it and eat it. “Why not eat it,” someone asks. You explain that if you let it live, it will yield eggs. A chicken and eggs is more valuable than just a chicken. Your interrogator is satisfied.
Utilitarianism, however, is a false position; this is reflected after further investigation. Utilitarianism makes a claim about all cases; it is meant to be a position that is not just correct some of the time, but all of the time. But Utilitarianism is not correct all of the time. I am going to present an example I thought of a few years ago, which has since convinced me of the blatant falsity of Utilitarianism. Note: there are other reasons it is false, but this reason is, I think, especially powerful.
Reductio Ad Absurdum
Suppose that you are evil, and that while walking around in the woods, you find a sharp knife. You pick up the knife and think, “I wish to violently kill the next person I encounter, because this would be fun.” A few minutes later, you see Little Susie Sweetheart sitting on a bench, licking a lollipop. You squint your eyes with hate and run toward Susie Sweetheart, swinging your knife wildly, intent on killing her. Susie sees you at the last second, and ducks. Your knife comes crashing down, not on Susie’s head, but on a lever that, unbeknownst to you, was positioned behind her head. The level is such that your pushing it with the knife has caused it to drop 100 tons of food onto a field in a starving country, thanks to an elaborate wiring system set up by humanitarian scientists doing an experiment.
Your wicked act has produced the greatest amount of social utility, and according to Utilitarianism, was correct. But your act is as utterly heinous as any just about any act imaginable. Therefore, if Utilitarinism is true, then some of the worst acts imaginable are morally right. But such acts are not right. Therefore, Utilitarianism is false.
